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PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE AND CITY-COUNTY
CONSOLIDATION UNDER THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The home rule and city-county consolidation amendments to the
Pennsylvania constitution,' together with the legislation enacted pursuant
thereto,2 ultimately will require the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
delineate the scope of the substantive powers devolved upon the City of
Philadelphia and the extent to which these powers are subject to the control
of the General Assembly.3
Historically, municipalities have been viewed as creatures of the state,
existing at its sufferance.4  They exercise only those powers "granted in
express words" and "those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted. . . ." 5 Dissatisfaction with the legislative
exercise of the Commonwealth's virtually complete control of municipal
government fomented an effort to shift the locus of local government powers
to the municipalities themselves, in the belief that a government framed
by the municipality, with officers chosen by the electorate and responsible
to it, and exercising plenary powers over its local affairs is better equipped
than the General Assembly to cope effectively with local problems.6 In
response to this pressure, an amendment to the Constitution in 1922 pro-
vided that "cities . . . may be given the right and power to frame and
adopt their own charters and to exercise the powers . . . of local self-
government, subject . . . to such restrictions, limitations and regulations,
as may be imposed by the Legislature." 7
Requisite enabling legislation was not forthcoming until the passage of
the First Class City Home Rule Act of 1949,8 which authorized the framing
and adoption of a charter by the city of Philadelphia 9 and the exercise
1. PA. CoNsT. art. XV, § 1 (home rule); PA. CoNs~T. art. XIV, § 8 (1951) (city-
county consolidation).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, §§ 13101-16, 13131, 13133, 13151-57 (Purdon 1957);
PHILADLPHIA Homi RuLv CHART4R ANN. (1951) (hereinafter cited as CHARTZR).
3. See McGOLDRiCK, LAw AND PRACTICE OF MuNICIPAL HOME Rui-1916-1930,
at 310-12 (1933).
4. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. Moir, 199
Pa. 534, 541, 49 Atl. 351 352 (1901) ; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 180 (1870) ;
1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98 (5th ed. 1911); CHICAGO HOM4 RULE
CommissION, Ri oRT 193 (1954).
5. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL COR'ORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911); American Aniline
Products, Inc. v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423, 135 Atl. 726, 727 (1927); Lesly v.
Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274, 43 Atl. 959, 961 (1899).
6. See 6 PA. LS_. J. 6167-6205 (1951).
7. PA. CoNsT. art. XV, § 1 (1922). The home rule amendment allows cities of
any particular class to be given the power to adopt charters. Ibid.
8. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-16, 13131, 13133, 13155-57 (Purdon 1957).
9. Philadelphia is the only city of the first class in the Commonwealth. "Those
[cities] containing a population of one million or over shall constitute the first class."
PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, § 13101 (Purdon 1957).
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by it of "all powers relating to its municipal government . . . to the full
extent that the General Assembly may legislate in reference thereto . .
and with like effect," "o subject to specified limitations.,- A charter was
framed by a charter commission and adopted by the electorate of the city
on April 17, 1951, with an effective date of January 7, 1952.12 Despite the
grant of authority, there still remains for judicial determination the extent
to which the General Assembly can legislate in conflict with the charter
or ordinances emanating from the city.
The grant of home rule authority over municipal affairs did not en-
compass the existing government of the county of Philadelphia,' 3 a political
unit geographically coextensive with the city of Philadelphia. An amend-
ment adopted at the general election of November 6, 1951 14 attempted to
facilitate the consolidation of Philadelphia's city and county affairs into a
single working government.15  Subsequently, a consistent formulation of
the steps necessary to effectuate this consolidation has been developed by
the courts.10
I. EFFECTUATION'OF CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION
A. Consolidation Under the Charter
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court early established that the city-county
consolidation amendment is self-executing to the extent that all county
offices became city offices, without legislative action, immediately upon
adoption of the amendment. 17 This proposition is clearly substantiated by
the language of clause (1) of the amendment:
"In Philadelphia all county offices are hereby abolished, and the
city shall henceforth perform all functions of county government within
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (Purdon 1957).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13131, 13133 (Purdon 1957).
12. There were certain exceptions to the January 7, 1952 effective date, not here
material. CnARTima, Section A-200. See Mortimer v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n,
380 Pa. 520, 112 A.2d 151 (1955). But cf. American Federation of State Employees
v. Philadelphia, 83 Pa. D. & C. 537 (C.P. 1952).
13. See PA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-7; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 7101-8802 (Pur-
don 1957). See also Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 361, 363, 370, 93 A.2d 834, 837,
838, 841 (1953).
14. PA. CONST. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 7. Note that the amendment was adopted sub-
sequent to the adoption of the home rule charter but prior to its effective date. See
text at note 12 supra.
15. See Cornman v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 312, 111 A2d 121 (1955). "Consolida-
tion of County and City functions was unquestionably wise. Geographically the area
of the City and of the County was identical. On occasion governmental functions con-
flicted or were duplicated. In the interest of efficiency and economy, it was regarded
wise to have a single directing head." Id. at 314, 111 A2d at 123.
16. The large number of decisions on the consolidation amendment and the home
rule charter have been attributed to the political conflicts induced by patronage pres-
sures. See statement of Hon. Joseph E. Clark, Jr., then Mayor of Philadelphia, to
the Chicago Home Rule Commission on March 15, 1954. Reprinted in CHIEcAGo HOmt
RULE CommissioN, REPORT 346, 356 (1954).
17. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 363-64, 93 A.2d 834, 838 (1953); Carrow v.
Philadelphia, 371 Pa. 255, 258-59, 89 A.2d 496, 498 (1952).
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its area through officers selected in such manner as may be provided
by law."' 8
The extent to which the First Class City Home Rule Act and the sub-
sequently enacted home rule charter transferred jurisdiction over the con-
solidated county offices from the state legislature to the city remained
unclear.19 The court in Carrow v. Philadelphia"0 applied the home rule
charter to county offices, holding that under the charter county employees
could not be dismissed without cause.2 ' The succeeding case of Lennox v.
Clark - extended the applicability of the charter to county officers, by
requiring them to abide by the sections of the charter governing legal
counsel for municipal offices 2 and the supplying of information to city
officials. 24  While both Carrow and Lennox applied the home rule charter
to former county offices on matters that can generally be characterized as
"personnel" or "internal administration," neither case decided whether the
city, acting under the charter without further legislative action by the
General Assembly, could alter the functions of the former county offices
or integrate them with those performed by the municipal government under
the charter. The court in Lennox expressly distinguished the charter's
applicability to matters of "personnel" in the former county offices from
its effect on the "duties or functions" performed by such offices,25 in order
to avoid a final determination of the meaning of an ambiguous limitation
on municipal authority contained in clause (7) of the amendment:
"Upon adoption of this amendment all county officers shall become
officers of the city of Philadelphia, and until the General Assembly shall
otherwise provide, shall continue to perform their duties and be elected,
appointed, compensated and organized in such manner as may be
provided by . . . the Constitution and the laws of the Common-
wealth in effect at the time this amendment becomes effective... " 26
The extent of the city's powers relative to consolidation must be de-
termined by the nature of the limitation imposed by the words, "until the
18. PA. CoNsTr. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 1 (1951). See Butcher v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa.
290, 292, 110 A.2d 349, 351 (1955) ; Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 363-64, 93 A.2d
834, 838 (1953).
19. See text at pp. 87-89 infra.
20. 371 Pa. 255, 89 A.2d 496 (1952).
21. Id. at 261, 89 A2d at 499. See CARaa, Section A-104.
22. 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953).
23. Id. at 369, 93 A.2d at 841. See CaAR R, Sections 4-400(a), 8-410.
24. Ibid. See CHAraM, Sections 8-103, 8-104. The court also held that under Sec-
tion A-104 employees had the privilege of taking a qualifying test to satisfy civil serv-
ice requirements, 372 Pa. at 368, 93 A.2d at 840; and that under section 10-107, officers
and employees are prohibited from engaging in political activity, id. at 369, 93 A.2d
at 841. For other decisions reached in Lennoz see note 48 and text at note 91 infra.
25. Id. at 363, 93 A.2d at 837-38.
26. PA. Co Nsr. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 7 (1951).
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General Assembly shall otherwise provide." 2 7 That the limiting phrase
modifies "officers," and, further, that no reference to county employees
appears, is obvious. Thus, employees are not within the express contem-
plation of the limitation. Implicit inclusion of employees within the limita-
tion by the phrase, "officers . . shall continue to perform their duties
and be . . . organized" as provided by existing law, was rejected in
Lennox on the ground that "duties" referred to the substantive purpose
for which the office was established, and not the ancillary power to control
employees,28 and that "organized" referred to the positions of the officers
and not to their employees 2 9 Therefore, the limitation in the amendment
applied, if at all, only to the performance of the substantive functions by
the county officers; other matters relating to the county officers and their
offices were properly within the scope of the powers devolved upon the
city in the home rule enabling legislation.
Whether the limitation, as defined, had any practical impact was
decided in Commwnwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Philadelphia.30 A city
ordinance abolishing the Board of Revision of Taxes,31 a former county
office, was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the limitation clause
of the consolidation amendment because it had been enacted without ena-
bling legislation from the General Assembly.32 The majority relied on the
literal meaning of the amendatory language, holding that consolidation of
functions must await future legislative action by the state.P The dissent
maintained that the limitation was meant to apply only on the contingency
that a home rule charter was not adopted by the City of Philadelphia.
34
Appraisal of the Triscott decision requires an understanding of the
chronology of both the consolidation amendment and the home rule legis-
lation. The amendment passed the General Assembly for the first time
in 1949, at the same session that the First Class City Home Rule Act
became law. Achievement of home rule, however, under the terms of the
enabling legislation awaited formulation and adoption of a charter by
Philadelphia.3 5 There being no guarantee that a charter would soon be
adopted, the possibility remained in 1949 that city-county consolidation
27. That cities possess an inherent right of local self-government which
can, in the absence of a grant from the state legislature, serve as a repository for the
exercise of municipal law-making powers has been effectively disclaimed. McBain,
The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Governnent I, 16 CoLUM. L. REV. 191
(1916) ; McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government II, 16
CoLum. L. !yv. 299 (1916). See 1 DILLOI, MUNIcIPAL CoaI'oR.AioNs § 237 (5th ed.
1911). See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 367, 369, 111
A.2d 136 (1955) ; American Aniline Products, Inc. v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423,
135 Atl. 726, 727 (1927) ; Lesly v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274, 43 Atl. 959, 961 (1899).
28. 372 Pa. 355, 364, 379, 93 A.2d 834, 838, 845 (1953).
29. Id. at 364, 93 A2d at 838.
30. 380 Pa. 367, 111 A2d 136 (1955).
31. PmltADELPHrA ORDIrANc-S 561-66 (Aug. 16, 1954).
32. 380 Pa. at 376, 111 A2d at 139, 140.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 383, 387-89, 111 A2d at 139, 140.
35. See text at note 8 supra.
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might be achieved without a shift to the city of power over its municipal
affairs. Further uncertainty was engendered by the fact that constitutional
amendment requires passage by two consecutive General Assemblies,36
elected biennially, 7 followed by approval of the state electorate.38 The
amendment by its own terms became effective on the date of its popular
approval at a general election, November 6, 195139 This uncertainty as
to the status of the county offices and the performance of their functions
necessitated the inclusion of an appropriate clause in the original amendment.
Meanwhile, a charter was framed and adopted on April 17, 1951, but, by its
own terms, it did not become effective until January 7, 1952, two months
subsequent to the effective date of the consolidation amendment.40 There
are, thus, reasonable grounds for construing the limitation as an alterna-
tive in the event that the city failed to adopt a charter. Nevertheless, the
argument can be made that the General Assembly intended to retain con-
trol of the functions of the county offices regardless of the possibility of
home rule.
41
While legislative history is inconclusive, language in another clause
of the consolidation amendment tends to support the position of the
dissent. Clause (5) makes the provisions of the home rule amendment
applicable "to the functions of the county government hereafter to be per-
formed by the city government." 42 This clause suggests that the General
Assembly contemplated a transfer of all its power over county offices by
writing in a policy favoring home rule. That the legislature could cede
control over county government to the city in advance of the adoption of the
consolidation amendment and a charter and contingent thereon was settled
by the decision in Lennox.4 While the clause is inconclusive, the acknowl-
edged purpose of both the home rule act and the consolidation amendment
was to permit local control of municipal affairs.4 4 Allowing the city to
reorganize the former county functions in the absence of a clear mandate
to the contrary would have been consistent with that end.
B. Consolidation Under the Statutes
Truscott v. Philadelphia left two alternatives for the completion of
city-county consolidation. The General Assembly could either directly
integrate functions of the county offices within the framework of the city
government or, by further enabling legislation, allow the city itself to in-
36. PA. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 1.
37. PA. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
38. PA. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 1.
39. PA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 7.
40. CiARi, Section A-200.
41. This argument must rest on the contention that "laws of the Commonwealth"
in the limiting clause, see text at note 26 supra, excludes the enabling act and the
charter, and refers only to the state laws substantively regulating the functions of the
county offices.
42. PA. CONST. art. XIV, § 8, ci. 5.
43. 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953).
44. See text at note 6 supra.
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tegrate the functions under the charter in accord with the home rule
doctrine of municipal self-government. The only objection to this alterna-
tive, that the limitation in clause (7) of the consolidation amendment makes
direct action by the General Assembly mandatory, was rejected in Com-
monwealth ex rel. Truscott v. DiLauro,4 which held that both the home
rule amendment and the consolidation amendment negated such an inter-
pretation. 46 The act validated by the DiLauro case permitted the city to
consolidate the functions of certain of the former county offices 47 which
the Lennox case had found to be subject to consolidation under the amend-
ment. Reorganization of the remainder of these offices must await future
legislative action.
48
Although the power of the city to consolidate duties of former county
officers is dependent upon permission of the legislature,49 the ability of the
legislature to undo consolidation once it has been authorized appears to be
severely limited by the decision in Meade v. Clark.50 The legislature en-
acted a measure making the "provisions . . . contained in the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter relating to civil service and prohibiting political
activity. . . ." inapplicable to the officers and employees of four former
county offices.61 Authority for such an act was sought in clause (2) of
the consolidation amendment:
45. 387 Pa. 506, 128 A2d 348 (1957).
46. Id. at 512-13, 128 A.2d at 350-51. Although the court did not cite any partic-
ular language in the consolidation amendment to support its position on the ability of
the legislature to delegate power to the city to alter the organization of former county
offices, it would seem that the language of clause (5) is decisive: "The provisions of
article fifteen, section one of the Constitution [providing for home rule] shall apply
with full force and effect to the functions of the county government hereafter to be
performed by the city government." PA. CoNsTr. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 5. See Common-
wealth ex rel. Truscott v. 'Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 367, 382, 111 A.2d 136, 142 (1955)
(concurring opinion). See text at notes 42-44 supra.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13132 (Purdon 1957) (Coroner, Recorder of Deeds,
City Treasurer, Clerk of the Court of Quarter Sessions, Oyer and Terminer and Gen-
eral Jail Delivery and the Board of Inspectors of Philadelphia County Prison). Only
the office of City Treasurer was involved in the litigation in the instant case. In Octo-
ber 1953 the city passed an ordinance, pursuant to the enabling legislation, su pra,
changing the office from an elective to an appointive one. PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES
549-54 (Oct. 16, 1953). Quo warranto proceedings were brought to remove defendant
who had been appointed City Treasurer subsequent to the November 1953 election,
and to substitute in his stead the winner of that election. Held, for the appointee.
387 Pa. 506, 128 A.2d 348 (1957).
48. The offices of Register of Wills and Prothonotary, denominated as county
offices in the constitution, PA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 1, were held in Lennox not to be
county offices for the purposes of the consolidation amendment. 372 Pa. at 370-72, 93
A.2d at 841-42. Since both the Register of Wills and the Prothonotary were specif-
ically given the power to appoint their employees by the judiciary article of the con-
stitution, PA. CoXsT. art. 5, § 7 (Prothonotary), § 22 (Register of Wills), the court,
relying on the handy rule of construction that a general provision does not impliedly
repeal a specific provision, held the consolidation amendment to be inapplicable. 372
Pa. at 370-72, 93 A.2d at 841-42. Consolidation of these two offices will require con-
stitutional amendment. See Burke, Courts and City-County Consolidation in Philadel-
phia, 57 DicK. L. Rev. 24 (1952).
49. Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 367, 111 A.2d 136
(1955). See text at notes 30-44 supra.
50. 377 Pa. 150, 104 A.2d 465 (1954).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13154 (Purdon 1957) (Sheriff, City Commissioners,
Board of Revision of Taxes, Registration Commissioners).
1957]
90 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
"Local and special laws, regulating the affairs of the city of Phila-
delphia and . . . prescribing the powers and duties of officers of the
city of Philadelphia, shall be valid notwithstanding the provisions of
section seven of article three of this Constitution." 52
Section seven of article three prohibits the General Assembly from enacting
any local or special legislation in twenty-eight categories, two of which are
"regulating the affairs of . . . cities" 5 and ". . . prescribing the powers
and duties of officers in . . . cities." 54 The court held that since the
consolidation amendment's exceptions to the prohibitions on legislative
action were worded identically with two of the prohibitions, the remaining
twenty-six prohibitions were operative. 5 The act was then held invalid
on two grounds. First, relating by its own terms to the city of Philadelphia,
it violated the prohibition against local legislation "incorporating cities...
or changing their charters." 11 Second, by distinguishing, without reason-
able basis for the classification, the officers and employees of these four
city offices from other officers and employees similarly situated, it violated
the constitutional prohibition against special legislation "granting to any
. . . individual any special privilege or immunity. . . .", 57
The remedy for the first of these constitutional defects is apparent. If
the act by its terms had referred to cities of the first class rather than
specifically to the city of Philadelphia, it would not have constituted local
legislation.58 Nevertheless, the act would still have conferred a special
"privilege or immunity" on the individuals designated. Although the
holding of the Meade case is factually limited to four of the former county
offices,5 9 any classification based purely on the distinction between former
county and former city offices would appear to be unreasonable, since all
county offices became offices of the city at the adoption of the consolidation
amendment.
However, the Meade case pertains to problems of personnel and
administration and not to the substantive functions of the former county
offices. Again a "personnel-function" distinction may be drawn, not on
the basis of express words in the consolidation amendment, but rather on
the basis of the proper spheres of state and local control.60 Thus, a former
county office performing substantive functions of state-wide concern could
52. PA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8, cl. 2.
53. PA. Co NsT. art. III, § 7, cl. 2.
54. PA. CoxsT. art. III,§ 7, cl. 15.
55. 377 Pa. at 154-55, 104 A.2d at 467.
56. PA. CoNsT. art. III,§ 7, cl. 11. 377 Pa. at 155-56, 104 A.2d at 467.
57. PA. CoNsT. art. III,§ 7, cl. 26. Id. at 155-57, 104 A2d at 467, 468.
58. Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554, 27 Atl. 356 (1893); Commonwealth
ex rel. Fertig v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258 (1879); Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338
(1875); Massey v. Philadelphia, I Week. Notes Cas. 140 (Pa. 1874). But cf. Phila-
delphia v. Westminster Cemetery Co., 162 Pa. 105, 29 Atl. 349 (1894).
59. See note 51 supra.
60. Cf. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 363-64, 93 A.2d 834, 838 (1953). See text
at note 25 mtpra.
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hardly be deemed beyond the reach of the General Assembly.6 Were the
city, acting under appropriate state enabling legislation, to abolish a county
office that performed certain state functions without providing for their
assumption by another department of the city administration, the state would
probably be empowered to undo the consolidation to the extent necessary
to assure their performance. Such a result rests on a theory of the
sovereignty of the state as to matters of state-wide concern.62  Whether
the "personnel-function" dichotomy permits the state to undo the con-
solidation of functions that are "properly" within the sphere of municipal
affairs depends in turn upon the extent to which the General Assembly,
having once granted home rule powers to the city of Philadelphia, can
subsequently legislate in conflict with the charter and the ordinances en-
acted under it."
II. HOME RULE INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A. Scope of the Original Grant
The home rule amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution did not
directly grant governmental power to any city in the Commonwealth. It
did provide that
".. . cities of any particular class, may be given the . . . power to
frame and adopt their own charters and to exercise the powers . . .
of local self-government, subject . . . to such restrictions, limitations
and regulations as may be imposed by the Legislature." 64
The amendment necessitates appropriate enabling legislation before local
charter-making can be undertaken. The First Class City Home Rule Act 65
constituted a grant of power to Philadelphia, the only first class city in the
Commonwealth, 6 to legislate with respect to its municipal functions as fully
as the General Assembly was empowered to act,67 subject to specified
exceptions.6 8 The most important of these is a denial of municipal power
to legislate in conflict with a state act that is "applicable in every part of
the Commonwealth" 60 or "applicable in all the cities of the Common-
wealth." 7 0 There is nothing in the language of the enabling act which
qualifies this exception. Presumably, a provision in the charter must fall,
even though it relates to "municipal functions" if it conflicts with a state
61. See Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A2d 352, 354 (1957); Len-
nox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 378, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953).
62. Iid.
63. See text at pp. 95-97 infra.
64. PA. Co NsT. art. XV, § 1.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-16, 13131, 13133, 13155-57 (:Purdon 1957).
66. See note 9 mipra.
67. PA. STAT. ANNr. tit. 53, § 13131 (Purdon 1957).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13131, 13133 (Purdon 1957).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(b) (Purdon 1957).
70. P- STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133(c) (Purdon 1957).
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legislative act of general application. 71  On the other hand, the enabling
act provides that charter provisions and amendments governing "municipal
functions" and not subject to an exception supersede any existing state
law to the extent that the two are in conflict. 2 Absent any conflict between
a state law and the charter, existing state law affecting the organization or
powers of the city remains in force.73
Any supersedure of an act of the state legislature by the charter must
be premised on a preliminary finding that the subject matter of the super-
seding charter provision is within the province of the city's "municipal
functions." 74 Charter provisions failing to meet this requirement must
fall as being outside the scope of the grant of powers in the enabling act.75
Clearly the personnel relationship between the city and its employees and
the form of the governmental structure are within its contemplation.
76
The grant of the power of taxation to maintain the operations of the city,
however, is apparently little more than a gesture when viewed in the light
71. But see Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A-2d 352 (1957), which ap-
parently confines the applicability of the enabling act's limitations on supersedure to
"substantive matters of state-wide concern." Id. at 410, 128 A.2d at 354. For a state-
ment of the enabling act limitations see text at notes 69-70 supra. For a discussion of
narrow view taken by the court in construing the limitations see text at notes 89-95
infra.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13111 (Purdon 1957). "Any new charter or amend-
ments to the [new] charter .. .shall become the organic law of the city.... So far
as the same are consistent with the grant of powers and the limitations . .. pre-
scribed [in the enabling act], they shall supersede any existing charter and all acts
. . . local, special, or general, affecting the organization, government and powers of
such city, to -the extent that they are inconsistent or in conflict therewith." Although
the section mentions only supersedure by the charter or by amendments to it, courts
have taken the view that the section encompasses ordinances, regulations and rules
enacted under the charter. Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957).
Cf. Warren v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955); Philadelphia Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Eckles, 376 Pa. 421, 103 A.2d 761 (1954).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13111 (Purdon 1957). "All existing acts or parts of
acts and ordinances affecting the organization, government and powers of the city,
not inconsistent or in conflict with the organic law so adopted, shall remain in full
force."
In Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A2d 238 (1955), a municipal zoning
ordinance was invalidated for failing to comply with a pre-charter statute governing
the procedure for enactment of zoning ordinances by cities of the first class. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 14755-56 (Purdon 1957). While the charter contained no special
procedural requirements for the enactment of zoning ordinances, it did provide a uni-
form procedure for the adoption of all city ordinances, CHARMR, Sections 2-201(5),
2-201(7), the terms of which had been compiled within the enactment of the ordinance
in question. The court, applying the canon of construction that a general law does not
repeal a special law unless the intent to do so clearly appears, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,
§ 563 (Purdon 1952), held that the special state law prescribing local zoning ordinance
procedure was an exception to the general procedure prescribed in the charter; and
that both provisions, being compatible, could be given effect. 382 Pa. 459, 472, 115
A.2d 238, 244. Such reasoning forecloses the problem of supersedure. Having con-
strued the charter to be inapplicable to a situation that it fairly meant to cover, the
resulting finding of consistency was inevitable. It seems that a proper approach would
have been first to determine whether there was a conflict, and then to have applied the
enabling act provision on supersedure. Such an approach would have produced a deci-
sion contrary to that reached by the court
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (Purdon 1957).
75. Ibid.
76. Gaul v. Philadelphia, 384 Pa. 494, 121 A.2d 103 (1956); Corniman v. Phila-
delphia, 380 Pa. 312, 111 A.2d 121 (1955) ; Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A2d 834
(1953) ; Carrow v. Philadelphia, 371 Pa. 255, 89 A.2d 496 (1952).
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of the limitations in the enabling act.77 That the city possesses a police
power to act for the health and welfare of its inhabitants was expressly
acknowledged in Warren v. Philadelphia 78 which upheld a city rent con-
trol ordinance. 79 But the limits of the city's "municipal functions" are
yet to be judicially determined. 0
Recognizing that the city can act in a particular area does not estab-
lish that city action must necessarily supersede action of the state in the
same area."' Determination of the scope of the city's municipal functions
for the purpose of supersedure should entail considerations different from
those associated with the determination of the city's power to act in the
absence of state regulation.8 2 Any attempted delineation of these functions
for the purpose of supersedure must recognize that municipal functions
and state affairs are not mutually exclusive; 83 that the question is one of
degree. In some cases the court apparently bases its decision on a deter-
mination of the extent to which municipal activities alter the positions of
those outside the city's jurisdiction.8 4 In these cases once the court has
established that certain municipal activities affect other portions of the
state to a minimal degree, it then determines that the activity should
reasonably be free of state control by characterizing it as a "municipal
function." 85 Other municipal laws having a substantial impact on those
outside the city are more properly the subject of state regulation alone.
But in still other cases courts have precluded municipal action, even though
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13133 (a) (8)- (9) (Purdon 1957). See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 15971 (Purdon 1957).
78. 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955). Implicit in the court's holding is a recogni-
tion that a municipality, acting under a home rule charter, may affect private law, at
least insofar as the effect is occasioned through the implementation of a valid regu-
latory policy. In this connection, see AMxICAN MUNICIPAL ASS'N, MOD.L CONsTITU-
TIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE § 6 (1953).
79. PHILADELPHIA ORDINacEs 256-68 (April 13, 1954).
80. See Vitacolonna v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 399, 115 A2d 178 (1955) (upheld
Philadelphia's water metering program).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13133(b) (c) (Purdon 1957). See Lennox v. Clark,
372 Pa. 355, 378, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953); Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407,
128 A.2d 352, 354 (1957).
82. Some authorities maintain that drawing a rational distinction between muni-
cipal and state affairs is impossible, with the result that courts are usually left with a
political decision that could best be resolved by the legislature. See Fordham & Asher,
Home Ride Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 25 (1948). See also
AmERICAN MUNICIPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE § 6, comment 3 (1953).That there is a meaningful distinction between
matters of municipal and state concern was suggested but its nature was not disclosed
in Richland, Constitutional City Home Ride in New York: II, 55 COLUM. L. REv.
598, 627-28 (1955).
83. See McGoLDRicK, LAW AND PRACTICE ov MUNICIPAL Homn RuL--1916-
1930, at 317 (1933); McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME
RIULE 307-10 (1916); Fordham & Asher, Home Ride Powers it; Theory and Practice,
9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 25-26 (1948).
84. See Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352, 354 (1957). No
attempt is made to resolve the method of distinguishing between state and municipal
affairs. The text statement is merely a rationalization of what courts appear to do.
See generally McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 317-51.
85. See Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 378, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953); Ebald v.
Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A2d 352, 354 (1957).
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the measure has no impact on persons outside the city, on the basis that
the subject matter is solely of state concern.86 Thus, there is no consistent
approach to the resolution of the problem. The line of demarcation cannot
clearly be discerned.87  Yet it would seem that regardless of the basis of
classification there are certain areas of regulation, notably that area
governed by the police power, in which both jurisdictions have concurrent
interests.88  For example, the interests of Philadelphia may require ad-
ditional highways to connect the city with New Jersey and Pennsylvania
highway systems. The state, on the other hand, might foster its economic
prosperity as a whole by incorporating a road through Philadelphia into
its highway development program. Under these circumstances the pro-
posed highway is the concern of both. The city and the state might act in
harmony but conceivably representation of the different interests might
produce conflicting results. In this case the city ordinance, even though re-
lated to a municipal function-providing roads of ingress and egress from
Philadelphia-should not supersede the state highway act, since, if a choice
must be made, ultimately the interest of the state cannot be subordinated
to that of the city.
The extent to which the charter does in fact supersede pre-existing
acts of the General Assembly has been expanded by the Supreme Court
beyond the plain meaning of the limitation on supersedure in the enabling
act.89 In Lennox v. Clark 90 the court held that the limitation of powers
in the enabling act encompassed only "substantive matters of State-wide
concern. . .. " " Thus, in Ebald v. Philadelphia 92 a regulation of the
Philadelphia Civil Service Commission limiting disability compensation
for policemen was upheld despite a conflicting state act that was applicable
throughout the state. Similarly, in Addison's case,9 the Supreme Court
validated a Philadelphia charter provision making the Civil Service Com-
mission's decision on the merits final.9 The court applied the "sub-
stantive matter of State-wide concern" test in holding that the charter
superseded a state act of general applicability which provided for judicial
review on the merits of all local civil service commission decisions. 95
86. Although Pennsylvania has yet to decide the matter, the experience of other
states would seem to indicate that education is a state matter which cannot be regu-
lated by municipalities. See MCGOLDRiCK, op. cit. supra note 83, at 320-23.
87. See note 83 supra. See also Greenwood, Powers of Municipal Corporations-
Including Home Rule, 22 TZNN. L. Rtv. 480, 482-85 (1952).
88. See McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 308-09. See also Mendelson, Paths
to Constitutimoal Home Rule for Municipalities, 6 VAND. L. Rev. 66, 69-74 (1952).
89. See text at notes 69-70 supra.
90. 372 Pa. 355, 93 A2d 834 (1953).
91. Id. at 379, 93 A2d at 845.
92. 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957).
93. 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956).
94. CHARmvR, Section 7-201.
95. 385 Pa. at 55, 122 A2d at 275. Most states that have considered the problem
presented by the Addison case have reached a contrary result, holding that the juris-
diction of the courts is a state matter, foreclosed to municipalities. See McGoLDIucK,
op. cit. supra note 83, at 324-26.
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The results of these cases can best be explained by the fact that all of
them dealt with the administration and personnel of the city and not with the
citizenry at large. A broader ground would be that none of the provisions
sustained had any material effect on persons in other portions of the state.
Only Ebald involved a conflict with the exercise of the state police power,
96
but the court's resolution of the problem appears sound for the afore-
mentioned reasons.
B. Legislative Withdrawal of Home Rule Powers
The question of legislative authority to modify or withdraw home rule
powers can arise in two ways. First, the state legislature could amend the
enabling act to directly deprive the city of a power previously exercised;
and second, the legislature could pass an act-applicable to cities of the
first class, or applicable to all cities but not a "substantive matter of
state-wide concern"--which conflicts with the charter or an ordinance en-
acted under it, indirectly modifying the municipal exercise of power under
the enabling act.
The Pennsylvania constitution provides that home rule power may
be given by the General Assembly "subject to such restrictions, limitations
and regulations, as may be imposed by the legislature." 97 The amendatory
language may give rise to two conflicting positions, each of which purports
to explain the ensuing relationship of the legislature and home rule city to
the grant of the powers of "local self-government." The first position
asserts that the constitution made the legislature the donee of a power to
grant municipal home rule. When once home rule is granted, it is to be
likened to a completed gift and cannot be unilaterally retracted. Under
this view the amendment's limitation clause means only that home rule
may be granted piecemeal. Home rule would be a one-way street. The
second position states that the source of municipal power under the
amendment is the legislature, and that what the legislature can give it can
take away. Under this construction the limitation in the amendment is
effective both at the time of the original grant and at a subsequent time.
Support for this theory is sought in the traditional, pre-home rule con-
cept of the city as a dependent agency of the state.98 Neither position is
foreclosed by the language of the amendment. 99
The Ebald case and other decisions in which the charter has been held
to supersede acts of the General Assembly are not binding, for all such
96. As a practical matter the disability payments are a form of workman's com-
pensation for public employees. Had the city enacted a disability payments ordinance
for private as well as public employees, the court probably would have been harder
put to sustain the ordinance.
97. PA. CoNsT. art. XV, § 1.
98. See text and notes at notes 4-5 supra.
99. The only court to have ruled directly on the issue held home rule to be
legislative in origin and subject to revision at the pleasure of the legislature. McHenry
v. Clark, 87 Pa. D. & C. 348, 359 (C.P. 1953), rev'd on other grounds sub twin. Clark v.
Meade, 377 Pa. 150, 104 A.2d 465 (1954). An annotation to the Home Rule Charter
incorporates the contrary theory. CaARTmR, SEcrIoN 1-100 (Annot. 3).
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cases have involved statutes enacted prior to the effective date of the
charter.10 0 Dictum in the Addison case 'll would seem to suggest that the
court considers home rule a constitutional grant. The court compared
the popular adoption by a city of its own charter with the pre-home rule
situation in which city power was determined under a direct legislative
grant.
"Whether a municipal charter comes into being by direct statu-
tory grant of the legislature or by adoption by the constituent elector-
ate in the exercise of power constitutionally reposed, it is as much
legislative in the one instance as in the other and has equal legal force
and standing in both. Indeed, a constitutionally permissible adoption
of a municipal charter by the electorate is not one wihit less in
dignity than a statute of the legislature granting a charter." 102
While the court could adopt from such a statement the principle that state
acts supersede the charter only on substantive matters of state-wide
concern, it is not bound to do so. In Schultz v. Philadelphia,1' decided
four days after Addison, dictum of the court clearly enunciates that home
rule is legislative in origin, and, therefore, subject to change in the discretion
of the General Assembly.
"If the City does possess . . . power it can be only by virtue
of the grant made to it by the Legislature of the right of self-govern-
ment, since all powers of every municipality . . . are solely deriva-
tive; a city is not a sovereign political entity but is strictly the
creature of the Legislature." 104
If this traditional view of the role of the city is maintained in a case re-
quiring the court to hold on the issue, the dependent position of Phila-
delphia would be unchanged despite its self-adopted charter, and the con-
stitutional amendment would have accomplished no more than to quell
any doubts as to the validity of legislative home rule.
Neither a constitutional nor a legislative grant of home rule con-
templates complete independence of the local unit from the state.0 5 The
generalized policy of both forms of home rule appears to be that matters
affecting only the municipality should be left to municipal control, while
matters materially affecting those outside the city should be resolved by the
legislature.1' 6 At first glance this policy would appear to dictate a result
100. The superseded statute in the Ebald case was an amendment enacted between
the date of adoption of the charter and its subsequent effective date. 387 Pa. 407,
128 A.2d 352, 354 (1957).
101. 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d 272 (1956).
102. Id. at 57, 122 A.2d 275-76.
103. 385 Pa. 79, 122 A.2d 279 (1956).
104. Id. at 83-84, 122 A.2d at 281.
105. See note 6 snpra.
106. See text and notes at notes 82-88 supra.
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forbidding legislative withdrawal of municipal powers that are not "sub-
stantive matters of state-wide concern." Yet the difficulty in drawing a
rational distinction between state and municipal affairs suggests that the
court can do no more than make arbitrary decisions, particularly in view
of the fact that many matters materially affect both the city and the state,
making some sort of concurrent jurisdiction desirable. 0 7 Further, experi-
ence might prove the breadth of powers delegated to the city to have been
unwise in light of state conduct in. an area, with need for continual adjust-
ments as time and conditions change. Legislative determination of these
essentially political questions would appear to be more appropriate. Con-
stitutional home rule would place a premium on legislative guesswork in
making the original grant. Were the court made the final arbiter in such
a situatior , errors illuminated by experience could not be readily redressed,
with recourse only to the time consuming process of constitutional
amendment.
Paradoxically, recognition of power in the legislature to withdraw
home rule powers or to restrain their exercise imposes a responsibility on
the legislature, the lack of which originally gave impetus to the home rule
movement. A minimum standard of responsibility is suggested by the
court in Ebald, which refused to infer from the passage of an act of general
applicability an intent to supersede the home rule charter in the absence
of an express statement to that effect.' 08 Such an approach has the ad-
vantage of requiring legislative cognizance of its actions which affect the
exercise of municipal powers under the charter. Beyond this judicially
imposed standard, responsibility of the legislature regarding municipal
affairs must be left to the democratic processes in selecting members of the
General Assembly. These in turn can be fostered only by public awareness
and understanding of the issues involved in striking the balance between
state and local power.
H.L.
107. Ibid.
108. 387 Pa. 407, 128 A2d at 354.
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